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Canada’s Amendment Rules: A Window into the Soul of a Constitution
Review essay
Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing
Constitutions*
Jamie Cameron**
Introduction
Many years ago, while watching returns from the Quebec secession referendum, Richard
Albert fielded a telephone call from the Yale football coach who hoped to recruit him as a studentathlete.1 As the yes and no sides traded leads on the TV screen, Albert and the coach shared
thoughts about Quebec and the US experience of secession and civil war. The date was October
30, 1995, the night the referendum failed by a razor-thin margin.2 Fascination with that moment
in time led Albert to scholarly prominence today, 25 years later.3 With his work spanning an
encyclopedic range of historical, theoretical, doctrinal, and comparative themes, Albert may now
be the world’s leading scholar on constitutional amendment.4 Years in the making, Constitutional

*New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, ISBN 9780190640484
**Professor emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I thank Richard Albert for inviting me to
participate in a panel discussion of Constitutional Amendments at the Conference on Constitution-Making and
Constitutional Change, at the University of Texas Law School (January 17-18, 2020); I also thank the editors for
inviting me to participate in this special issue of the Manitoba Law Journal.
1 Author Interview, Constitutional Amendments; https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/just-published/2019/10/15/authorinterview-constitutional-amendments-making-breaking-and-changing-constitutions.
2 The referendum question asked: “Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having made a
formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership, within the scope of the bill respecting the
future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995”? The turnout for the referendum was 93.52%,
and voters rejected the secession option, voting “no” by a margin of 50.58% to 49.42% for yes.
3 Author interview, supra note 1. Albert reports being “riveted” by the comparisons and contrasts between the two
countries.
4 Albert has countless scholarly articles, edited books, special law journal issues, and projects to his credit. His
principal book publications include R. Albert & D. Cameron, eds., Canada in the World: Comparative Perspectives
on the Canadian Constitution (“Canada in the World”)(UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018); R. Albert, P. Daly &
V. MacDonnell, eds., The Canadian Constitution in Transition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019); R.
Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou, eds., The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment (UK: Hart
Publishing, 2017).
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Amendments explains how amendment rules define a constitution’s integrity, ensuring its
longevity by allowing and even inviting formal changes to its text.5
Constitutional Amendments is prodigious and monumental, connecting abstract issues of
textual design to the follies of constitutional amendment over diverse variables of time and place.
Canada’s story is there too, though only as part of a complex narrative on constitutional change in
Japan, the United States, South Korea, Brazil, and countless nation states whose amendment
experiences are profiled. Albert’s sweep of the subject is so complete that even if the Kingdom of
Bhutan is not discussed, little else is overlooked.6
Albert’s journey was driven by an intellectual curiosity and persistence that traces to home,
the histrionics of Canada’s constitutional patriation in 1982, and its aftershock reforms, the Meech
Lake and Charlottetown Accords.7 These at times harrowing events generated a contemporaneous
literature that is rich, but introspective in its focus on why constitutional reform failed so
dramatically after 1982.8 With the passage of time, a renewal of interest in Canada’s amendment

5

Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions (UK: Oxford University Press, 2019)
(“Constitutional Amendments” or “Amendments”).
6 I have teased Albert about Bhutan, a constitutional monarchy with a constitution that was adopted in 2008.
7 The Constitution was “patriated” through statutory amendments to incorporate textual amendment rules;
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c.11, Sched.B. Five years later, on April 30, 1987, the first ministers reached
agreement on the Meech Lake Accord, which proposed amendments aimed at rectifying Quebec’s exclusion from
patriation (the “Quebec Round”). Following a difficult history, the MLA failed three years later, on June 23, 1990. It
was followed by the Charlottetown Accord, also known as the “Canada Round” of constitutional reform, which
addressed the deficiencies of the MLA by proposing a comprehensive package of constitutional amendments. After
negotiations were completed on August 28, 1992 the Accord was voted down in a nationwide referendum held on
October 26, 1992; see infra note 70.
8 See, e.g., Keith Banning and Richard Simeon (eds.), And No One Cheered: Federalism, Democracy and the
Constitution Act (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1983); Roy Romanow, John Whyte and Howard Leeson, Canada
… Notwithstanding- The Making of the Constitution 1976-1982 (Canada: Carswell/Methuen, 1982)
[Notwithstanding]; Robert Sheppard and Michael Valpy, The National Deal: The Fight for a Canadian Constitution
(Toronto: Books, 1982) [The National Deal]; Edward McWhinney, Canada and the Constitution, 1979-1982:
Patriation and the Charter of Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982) [Canada and the Constitution];
Ron Graham, The Last Act: Pierre Trudeau, the Gang of Eight, and the Fight for Canada (Canada: Penguin Canada,
2012) [The Last Act]; Patrick Monahan, Meech Lake: The Inside Story (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991)
[Inside Story]; Andrew Cohen, A Deal Undone: The Making and Breaking of the Meech Lake Accord (Vancouver:
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constitutionalism, led principally by Albert, offers fresh perspective. 9 In this, he is uniquely
positioned as an inside-outside observer: a Canadian who came of age at the time of the 1995
secession referendum and developed an abiding intellectual interest in amendment processes
worldwide. Over the years, Albert developed a complex theory of amendment that is enriched by
a variety of disciplinary perspectives. Constitutional Amendments thrives on the mysteries of
constitutional change everywhere, including and especially in Albert’s homeland.
Other reviews that linger on the author’s theories and comparative perspectives may bypass
the book’s implications for Canadian amendment constitutionalism. This review takes a different
approach, offering a form of patriation that brings Albert home and highlights the relationship
between his conception and Canada’s experience of constitutional amendment.
Mapping his amendment template onto domestic experience is no simple task, and the
modest goal, for now, is to look selectively at concepts that offer insight into Canada’s amendment
narrative. Specifically, this review draws on Albert’s work to suggest a simple but sharp insight
linking the 1867 Constitution’s failure to provide textual rules to the steadfast unamendability of

Douglas & McIntyre, 1990) [Meech Lake Accord]; Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick Monahan (eds.), The
Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum and the Future of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) [The
Charlottetown Accord]; Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?, 2nd
edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) [Odyssey]; and Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada:
Language, Culture, Community, and the Canadian Constitution (Canada: McGill-Queens University Press, 1994)
[Reimagining Canada].
9 See, e.g., Albert, Daly & MacDonnell, The Canadian Constitution in Transition, supra note 4; Lois Harder and
Steven Patten (eds.), Patriation and Its Consequences: Constitution Making in Canada (Canada: UBC Press, 2015);
Richard Albert, “The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada”, Alta. L. Rev., 53 (2015), 85-114; Richard
Albert, “Constitutional Amendment by Stealth”, McGill L.J., 60:4 (2015), 673-736; Richard Albert, “The Conventions
of Constitutional Amendment in Canada”, (2016) 53 O.H.L.J. 399 (addressing aspects of Canadian amendment
constitutionalism); Kate Glover, “Structure, Substance & Spirit: Lessons in Constitutional Architecture from the
Senate Reform Reference”, S.C.L.R., 67 (2nd edition) (2014), 221-255; and Kate Glover, “Complexity and the
Amending Formula”, Constitutional Forum, 24:2 (2015), 9-16 (exploring the relationship between constitutional
interpretation and constitutional amendment).
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the Canadian Constitution.10 More than twenty-five years after the Charlottetown Accord failed
on October 26, 1992, the Constitution may be more “frozen” than ever.11 Yet in taking the country
to the brink of dissolution, patriation and the Accords overshadowed the longitudinal history of
constitutional change. Canada’s amendment dilemma is not only a byproduct of patriation, but
traces to the genesis of the Constitution in 1867 and its primal failure to provide textual rules for
change.
Albert offers a conceptual framework for placing Canada’s amendment constitutionalism
in perspective. Of primary importance in Constitutional Amendments is Albert’s profound regard
for rules and conviction that amendment rules are a “window into the soul of a constitution”.12 If
a constitutional text that lacks amendment rules is essentially unamendable, it is difficult to fathom
how Canada’s Constitution functioned for about 115 years without such rules. At the least, how
that oversight or congenital defect affected its constitutional “soul” raises intriguing and unsettling
questions. In addition, “amendment rigidity” and “constructive unamendability” are two of
Albert’s focal concepts that also have salience for Canada. While the study of rigidity focuses on
the relative threshold of amendment difficulty and whether textual rules can make constitutions
too difficult to amend, “constructive unamendability” incorporates the organic variables outside

10

This review deals with “multilateral” amendment under the 7/50 and unanimity provisions of the Constitution,
and not forms of amendment that do not require the participation and agreement of the provinces, collectively,
and federal government. Canada Act 1982, supra note 7, Part V, ss. 38-49. The provinces and federal government
can make unilateral amendments under ss. 44 and 45, and bilateral amendments relating to some but not all
provinces are governed by s.43. Sections 38-40 and 42 address the general amending formula, or 7/50
requirement, and s. 41 specifies five amendments that require the unanimous consent of Parliament and all
provinces.
11 R. Albert, “The Frozen Constitution”, Runnymede Society, Summer Speaker Series, July 9, 2020 (explaining how
and why constitutional amendment in Canada is “frozen”).
12 Constitutional Amendments, supra note 5, at 2.
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of text – the synergies of amendment culture – that can frustrate and undermine a text’s
prescriptions for amendment.13
In the process of transformative change, Canada learned that manipulating amendment’s
legality, or rules, could not close a legitimacy gap that did not arise for the first time during
patriation and the Accords. Historic in nature, this gap was already ingrained in amendment
culture; as such, it illustrates how the synergy of rules and Albert’s forms of unamendability reflect
core concepts of legality and legitimacy. Accordingly, his concept of a constitution’s soul is not
limited to the legal or formal rules for change but, in fundamental terms, must include their
legitimacy as well. As Canada’s history demonstrates, a process of amendment that lacks
legitimacy can compromise and even jeopardize a constitution’s soul. 14
Amendment matters15
Without more, Albert’s command of his subject, worldwide and from every analytical
vantage, is a feat of scholarly and intellectual magnitude. Notably, his diligence is in furtherance
of a deeper quest for order in the processes of constitutional amendment, which stems from his
faith in text, and belief that “[n]o part of a Constitution is more important than its rules of
change”.16 No wide-eyed idealist, Albert is well aware of sham constitutions and “authoritarian
commandeering”, both which subvert a constitution’s lofty aims for unprincipled or nefarious
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See generally, ibid. at 95-172 (Part Two: Flexibiliy and Rigidity).
On legitimacy, see generally R. Fallon Jr., “Legitimacy and the Constitution”, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787 (2005)
(categorizing and describing three conceptions of a constitution’s legitimacy, including its sociological authority or
acceptance by the democratic community). See also J. Cameron, “Legitimacy, Legality and Constitutional
Amendment in Canada”, in Albert & Cameron, eds., Canada in the World, supra note 4, at 98 (discussing the
relationship of legality and legitimacy in Canada’s history of constitutional amendment).
15 Constitutional Amendments, supra note 5, at 2 (stating, “I show in this book how amendment works and why it
often fails, what we can learn from various designs around the world, and why amendment matters in
constitutionalism; emphasis added).
16 Ibid. at 261.
14
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purposes. Stating that examples “abound” of “suspicious amendment design”, he explains that
exploiting the amendment process to consolidate authoritarian powers or establish dynasties
perverts the essential morality of a constitution. 17 Parenthetically, a case in point is the referendum
of June, 2020, which approved amendments to the Russian Constitution empowering current
President Vladimir Putin potentially to remain in office up until 2036.18 Aware of those dynamics
and the myriad ways a constitution’s morality can be compromised, Constitutional Amendments
seeks to ennoble the amendment process, enfolding it in a framework of principled design. Though
a nation’s ambient constitutional culture may pose challenges, Albert has at least provided a
blueprint to follow in making, breaking, or changing its constitution.
Chapter by chapter, Constitutional Amendments builds toward a high-level, structural
template that can guide the design and implementation of textual amendment rules. The work-up
culminates in a chapter titled “The rules of law”, which pivots around four matrices that address
the foundations, pathways, specifications, and codification of amendment rules. 19 Whether in
making or amending constitutional text, the goal is to align design variables with the prerogatives
of an amendment culture, and fashion a text that finds resonance with, and expresses a
community’s constitutional soul. In Albert’s words, the “prime objective” is to create rules of
change that “keep the constitution stable and true to popular values but always changeable when
necessary”.20 As suggested above, a constitution’s soul should be understood holistically to
embrace its sociological legitimacy as well as the formal legality of the rules for change. A

17

Ibid. at 49-51.
“Russia Plans July 1 Vote on Putin’s Constitutional Amendments after Coronavirus Delay”, The Moscow Times,
June 1, 2020; online https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/01/russia-plans-july-1-vote-on-putinsconstitutional-amendments-after-coronavirus-delay-a70447; “The Theatrical Method in Putin’s Vote”, The New
York Times, July 1, 2020; online https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/world/europe/putin-referendum-voterussia.html
19 Constitutional Amendments, supra note 5, at 261-71 (“Conclusion - The Rules of Law”).
20 Ibid. at 271.
18
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constitution’s supreme or sovereign status is its soul and the source of its legitimacy in the
community.
It is axiomatic in Albert’s conception that amendment rules stand “atop the constitution’s
hierarchy of norms” and sit “at the base of its architecture”. 21 He is passionate that rules of this
stature cannot be taken for granted, but must be thoughtfully designed. When “carefully
constructed and deployed with deliberation”, amendment procedures “translate popular
preferences into law while balancing these preferences against the most fundamental values in the
polity”.22 Amendment rules are legitimizing because they separate constitutional text from
ordinary legislation, presenting a concept of constitutionalism, creating a framework of structural
and institutional confidence, and defining a sovereign community’s relationship with change over
time. Formal rules “telegraph when and how a constitution changes”, producing “legislatively or
popularly validated changes that are accepted as authoritative”. 23 The stakes in defining a
constitution’s mechanism for adaptive change are high, because amendment rules expose a
constitution’s “deepest vulnerabilities” and reveal its “greatest strengths”. 24
No constitutional text is perfect or immutable, and rules are time- and culture-bound, often
malleable, and frequently fallible. Moreover, history’s pageant is far too undependable to make
textual calculations impervious to the interventions of chance. Constitutional Amendments
illustrates how unpredictable constitutional change can be, and how communities adapt, managing
imperfect texts and dysfunctional systems of amendment. In this pageant, Canada’s amendment
history is at least idiosyncratic and even bizarre. To begin, the 1867 Constitution’s failure to
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Ibid. at 2.
Ibid. at 39.
23 Ibid. at 269.
24 Ibid. at 2.
22
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provide for its own amendment is a phenomenon of constitutionalism that invites ongoing pause
and reflection.25 From Albert’s perspective, a text without amendment rules is “not a reasonable
option in the modern world.26 As Edmund Burke notably observed, “a state without the means of
some change is without the means of its conservation”.27 Against that backdrop, it is difficult not
to view this congenital defect as one of the Canadian Constitution’s “greatest vulnerabilities”.
Contrary to expectations, the Constitution remained unamendable even after the
entrenchment of amendment rules in 1982. Rather than liberate the process from the anomalies of
surrogate legality by the UK Parliament, Part V’s amendment rules were less than authoritative
after patriation, when both Accords set standards for validation that were not constitutionally
required. Failed reform led to the present, in which constitutional amendment is subject, both
formally and informally, to a bewildering cacophony of textual, statutory, and unwritten rules. 28
To recap, in the space of about twenty years, Canada swung wildly from a protracted history of no
rules for change to a status quo of too many rules.29
Amendment rigidity has been a constant in Canadian constitutionalism, before and after
patriation, and with or without rules. As noted, amendment rules must both pause and permit
change, calibrating a balance aimed at a form of adaptive continuity that can preserve a
constitution’s legitimacy over time. Amendment standards must be rigid enough to protect the
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The focus is the written Constitution and its failure to prescribe rules for amendment of the text, and not the
unwritten Constitution, defined in the main though not exclusively by the Westminster tradition of parliamentary
government, including the principles of responsible government and unwritten constitutional conventions.
26 Constitutional Amendments, ibid. at 271.
27 Quoted, Ibid.
28 See infra note 72 (providing a list of extra-textual requirements).
29 J. Cameron, “Legitimacy, Legality”, supra note 14, at 119, fn 85 (stating that “[e]xtra-textual constraints aimed at
enhancing the legitimacy of amendment complicate and obscure the process, and delegitimize the rules for
change”). See also R. Albert, “The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada”, supra note 9 (explaining that
in making the Constitution impossible to amend, extra-textual restrictions weaken democracy and undermine the
purpose of “writtenness”).

9

integrity of the founding text, and sufficiently flexible to preserve its vitality. A text that is
amended simply and frequently as a matter of routine might struggle to establish its status and
legitimacy as a constitutional instrument.30 Otherwise, however, onerous amendment rules can
valorize the original text, risking dissonance between the imperatives for change and a static,
unresponsive, master text.31 The scholarship on amendment rigidity measures the relative
difficulty of constitutional amendment across variables but, as Albert explains, presents
methodological issues and challenges.32 Because it does not easily fit the model, Canada has not
been included and plotted on the rigidity spectrum, in part because – at least historically –
unamendability was grounded in the absence, not the presence, of rules.33
Albert privileges the role of text and formal rules without overlooking the dynamics of
constitutional and political culture. Specifically, he recognizes that rules are only part of the
narrative, because the formalities of amendment legality sit within a culture that can exacerbate or
relax the process of change.34 Countless in scope and variety, the variables and contingencies that
affect amendment’s chances can accelerate, redirect, or incapacitate constitutional change. Outside
the limits of text, uncodified factors can be at work, undermining and incapacitating constitutional
amendment. In this way, ambient constitutional politics can place added pressure on reformers to
perform “impossible heroics” for amendment to succeed. 35 As noted above, the dynamics of
amendment culture describe a vital relationship between the rules or legality, and the legitimacy
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Constitutional Amendments, supra note 5, at 271 (noting that “hyper flexibility” is inadvisable because it erodes
the distinction between a constitution and a statute).
31 Ibid. at 255 (noting that “the text never appears in any other way than perfected”) and 271 (stating that
unamendability exposes the “exaggerated self-assurance the authoring generation has in itself”).
32 Ibid. at 95-105.
33 Ibid. at 105-10 (“The Missing Case of Canada”); see also Albert, “The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in
Canada”, supra note 9.
34 Ibid. at 110-19.
35 Ibid. at 95, 158-9.
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of constitutional change. Legality works in tandem with legitimacy, and though the two typically
align, gaps may be present at the moment of constitution making, or may surface over the life of a
constitution. These gaps and deficits can embed in the constitutional politics, conditioning cultural
responses to change.
Shortfalls in amendment legitimacy were at least nascent in 1867 when Canada adopted a
constitution that did not address the legality of textual change. Though not inevitable, those
shortfalls or gaps deepened with the evolution of federalism, and widened to a point of
unamendability after Canada achieved formal independence in 1931. The lack of rules led to a
stalemate that rendered Canada’s Constitution impossible to amend, at least until the heroics of
patriation intervened. That is when the pattern was broken a single time in 1982, before deeper
and more tenacious forms of unamendability surfaced, despite and even because of the newly
entrenched rules.
The culture of amendment, its evolution over time, and engagement with the legitimacy of
change are critical features of Canada’s amendment history. The Constitution’s unamendability
describes a complex interaction, in which the standards for amendment continued to shift, without
success, to accommodate ongoing legitimacy deficits. In principle, when the legality and
legitimacy of constitutional amendment are aligned, heroics should not be necessary. Canada’s
Constitution is unamendable at present because there are no more heroics and, in the meantime,
these core elements remain misaligned.

11

Amendment rules: the soul of a constitution
Stalled for more than 50 years after Canada’s independence in 1931, the impasse on
constitutional amendment ended with the brinkmanship of patriation. 36 Though Canada is not now
at risk of dissolution, as it was in the 1990s, its chronic unamendability may be the Constitution’s
deepest vulnerability. Largely untested to this point, Part V may offer Canada its best chance of
addressing and resolving its amendment dilemma. For that to happen, Canada must re-consider
the status quo of extra-textual, supplementary burdens on constitutional reform, and accept the
legitimacy of Part V’s amending formulas.
Amendment without rules: 1867-1982
In its own pragmatic way, Canada straddled the line between British and American
tradition, adopting a constitution “similar in nature to that of the United Kingdom” that mimicked
some of the structural features of its US counterpart. 37 The fledgling dominion of Canada united
four colonies under a written constitutional text that incorporated the unwritten rules and principles
of British constitutionalism. The British North America Act, or BNA Act, borrowed the concept of
federal union from the United States, but edged it toward unitary features, enriching the federal
government’s powers and pronouncing it paramount over the provinces. 38 Meanwhile,
parliamentary supremacy, the mainstay of Westminster constitutionalism, co-existed with a
written constitution, a textual division of powers, and a system of judicial review and constitutional
interpretation.39

36

Ibid. at 210-13 (“Time and Brinkmanship”).
Preamble, British North America Act 1867, 30-31 Vict., c.3 (UK). Re-named the Canada Act, 1867, supra note 7.
The 1867 Constitution is referred to here as the BNA Act here, for historical purposes.
38 Textual elements of the federal government’s paramount status include the power to disallow provincial
legislation and appoint the lieutenant governors of the provinces (ss. 58, 90, and 55-57), as well as the peace,
order and good government power, the 27 heads of enumerated power, and the deeming clause of s.91. Ibid.
39 Judicial review by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council evolved under the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 28-29
Vict. C.63 (1865)(UK), which prohibited conflict between domestic and imperial legislation.
37
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On the surface, Canada’s pre-textual amendment history was relatively quiet. Prior to
independence under the Statute of Westminster, amending the Constitution was an exercise in
cordiality, because it was carried out, at one remove, through a process of statutory legality by the
UK Parliament. At Confederation, there was little awareness that the lack of textual rules posed an
obstacle, because imperial sovereignty provided a solution. The BNA Act was a constitutional text,
but also an imperial statute that was subject to parliamentary supremacy and amendment by the
UK Parliament.40 Under the principle of legislative sovereignty, the British Parliament could
amend or repeal any statute, including the BNA Act. Rather than exercise its power to amend the
BNA Act unilaterally, the UK Parliament recognized Canada’s autonomy to amend the
Constitution. Not long after 1867, unwritten conventions of imperial governance crystallized; these
conventions established that the UK Parliament would only amend the Constitution at Canada’s
request and would enact amendments sought by the federal government.41
In hindsight, the Constitution’s failure to prescribe rules for change was not merely an
unfortunate omission but, more fundamentally, a primal flaw in the BNA Act’s structure and text.42
Not surprisingly, it became progressively more difficult, and then impossible, for Canada to
legitimize constitutional reform in the absence of formal rules, or any framework of constitutional
legality. Though the 1867 Constitution was amended more than twenty times prior to patriation,
the proxy of statutory UK legality was not sustainable.43 In the first instance, the process bypassed
the provinces, whose interests were engaged by any amendment that affected their jurisdiction or
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Colonial Laws Validity Act, ibid.
P. Monahan & B. Shaw, Constitutional Law, 4th ed., at 174 (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2013).
42 Note that some amendments could be undertaken domestically; see, e.g., ss. 55, 52, 40, 51, 35 and 18
(pertaining to “housekeeping” matters in the House of Commons and Senate); s.92(1) (provincial constitutions);
and s.91(1) (the admission of new provinces).
43 Monahan & Shaw, supra note 41, at 165.
41
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powers.44 As Canada evolved, the provinces flourished and a robust view of provincial autonomy
was instantiated in the jurisprudence.45 Whatever was intended at the point of Confederation,
excluding the provinces from the amendment process increasingly posed an affront to federalism.
In addition, the lack of amendment rules bizarrely prevented Canada from achieving
sovereignty under the Statute of Westminster, which in 1931 released Canada and other
Commonwealth dominions from the vestiges of imperial rule.46 The dilemma for Canada was that,
by definition, independence would terminate the practice of surrogate amendment by the UK
Parliament. Absent that legality or any other form of amendment rules, the BNA Act was at risk of
being altered by ordinary statutes enacted either by the federal government or any of the provinces.
Because there would be no legal rule to prevent or prohibit it, a lack of amendment legality
prevented Canada from achieving full independence.47 To address that defect and protect the
integrity of the Constitution, the BNA Act was excepted from provisions in the Statute of
Westminster granting Canada its independence.48 The anomalous lack of textual rules meant that
Canada could only achieve amendment sovereignty by entrenching a process of legality, or textual
rules, in the Constitution. In the meantime, the UK Parliament would continue to act as a “bare

44

The UK convention considered requests for amendment by the federal government as legitimate, and the lack of
rules in the BNA Act meant that the provinces had no legal authority to prevent the federal government from
proceeding unilaterally. Cameron, “Legality, Legitimacy”, supra note 14, at 108.
45 See, e.g., Hodge v. the Queen (1883) 9 App.Cas. 117, at 132 (declaring that the provinces are “supreme” and
have authority that is as “plenary and ample” under s.92 as the federal government’s under s.91).
46 1931, 22-23 Geo. 5. c.4, s. 4.
47 P. Hogg, “A Comment on the Canadian Constitutional Crisis” (1980), Yale Studies in World Public Order 285-96,
at 286, 289 (acknowledging this risk).
48 s. 7, Statute of Westminster, supra note 46 (stating that nothing in the Act applies to the repeal, amendment, or
alternation of the BNA Act).
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legislative trustee”, amending the Constitution indefinitely, until Canada settled its domestic rules
for constitutional change.49
Though a combination of imperial sovereignty and statutory legality spared Canada the
ignominy of being legally unable to change its Constitution, seeking amendments through a
surrogate foreign legislature was more demeaning after 1931. The federal government followed
the colonial amendment process for the last time in 1949, and no amendments were attempted
between 1964 and 1982. 50 Meanwhile, the first ministers, comprising the prime minister and
premiers of the provinces, negotiated without success on a process for domestic constitutional
amendment.51 Two core challenges could not be overcome. Agreement on the formal rules for
amendment was one obstacle, but the partners to Confederation also had to decide what threshold
of agreement was required to endorse those rules.52 Once those issues were resolved, Canada could
invite the UK Parliament to work “the old machinery” one more time and “patriate” the
Constitution.53
If it was not the objective, negotiations at the level of executive federalism tended to point
toward a standard of unanimity, either as a default expectation or imperative – the realpolitik – of
federalism.54 Short of unanimity, formulas that would advantage some regions or provinces in the
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Justice I. Rand, “Some Aspects of Canadian Constitutionalism” (1960) 38 Can. B. Rev. 35, at 45 (describing
Canada’s unique situation and the UK’s role in “effecting the will of Canada”).
50 Cameron, “Legality, Legitimacy”, supra note 14, at 113.
51 Over the course of fourteen high-level meetings between 1931 and 1982, the process of executive federalism
failed to produce agreement on an amending formula. Cameron, “Legality, Legitimacy”, ibid., at 111. See generally,
J. Hurley, Amending Canada’s Constitution: History, Processes, Problems and Prospects (Canada: Minister of Supply
and Services Canada, 1996).
52 The two thresholds might not necessarily mesh; negotiations could require or expect all first ministers to agree
on rules for change that did not require unanimity for all amendments.
53 Sir William Jowitt, quoted in Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753, at 795 (“the Patriation
Reference”).
54 According to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, “we took the idea of unanimity and made it a tyrant…. We were led
by the dictates of unanimity to bargain freedom against fish, fundamental rights against oil, the independence of
our country against long-distance telephone rates”. Quoted in Graham, The Last Act, supra note 8, at 68.
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amendment process, at the expense of others, threatened the equal status of all.55 Proposals along
such lines were untenable because they could not satisfy the demands of Canada’s evolving system
of federalism.
From the perspective of Constitutional Amendments, a written constitution’s failure to
anticipate its own amendment is a source of deep vulnerability. Even as the UK Parliament’s role
as a surrogate had diminishing legitimacy, there was a vacuum on the legality of amendment. The
years stretched to decades and the vacuum could not be overcome because no form of amendment
legality could succeed without aligning with the demands of legitimacy which, at the time, were
focused on the constitutional politics of Canadian federalism. The impasse could not be broken
without heroics that achieved amendment legality, but did so at the expense of its legitimacy.
Amendment rules and impossible heroics: patriation and the Accords
Canada’s version of constitutional “heroics” prompted forms of brinkmanship that
exacerbated existing gaps and generated additional deficits of amendment legitimcacy. Although
patriation may have been a constitutional “miracle”, the “night of the long knives” gambled
Canada’s future on the decision to isolate Quebec. 56 Whether Quebec’s perceived exclusion from
constitutional reform made a remedial process necessary or inevitable remains a matter of debate
and opinion. Amid Quebec’s self-proclaimed alienation from the “rest of Canada” (ROC) and a
rising focus on separation, the “Quebec Round” of reform and MLA was celebrated in 1987 as a
nation-saving miracle.57 Consequently, it is difficult to overstate how serious the fallout was, not
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only in the moment but for the course of constitutional amendment, when the Accord faltered three
years later, on the final day of the ratification period.
Thirty years ago, on June 23, 1990, the MLA expired after two provinces, Manitoba and
Newfoundland, failed to ratify. During the countdown, the MLA’s prospects for ratification were
not improved after then Prime Minister Mulroney put out a boast that he called the last-minute
first ministers meeting to roll the constitutional dice.58 The suggestion that reluctant premiers were
pressured and manipulated further undercut a fragile agreement – one that emerged from a dinner
meeting that famously lasted seven days – to ratify the Accord in exchange for a promise to address
other issues on the reform agenda, forthwith.59 The MLA’s failure meant that Canada had said
“no” to Quebec for the second time, and led to Quebe’s ultimatum setting October 26, 1992 as the
deadline for constitutional reform or the alternative of a secession referendum.60 The
Charlottetown Accord was valiant but flawed; remarkably, the Accord was reached within an
impossible deadline that averted the threatened referendum on separation. Yet, as explained below,
the Accord’s package of reforms was too bloated to pass muster in a nationwide referendum.
In combination, patriation and the Accords marked a period of unprecedented histrionics
in amendment history. Both Accords were undercut by the relentless pressures and complex

from the provinces; entrenched Quebec’s right to three judges on the Court; and allowed the provinces to opt out
of share cost programs, under certain conditions; and granted all provinces a veto on s.42 amendments. See
Monahan, Inside Story, supra note 8, at 297-305 (Appendix 3, text of the MLA), pp. 306-14 (Appendix 4, 1990
Constitutional Agreement).
58 In an interview, the prime minister stated, in an attempt to pressure hold-out premiers to ratify the MLA, that
“It’s like an election campaign. You’ve got to work backwards. You’ve got to pick your dates and move backward
from it. I said (to my aides) that’s the day that I’m going to roll all the dice. It’s the only way to handle it” (emphasis
added). See online, “A Long Day for Canada: On the Death of the Meech Lake Accord”, Los Angeles Times, June 26,
1990: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-06-26-wr-662-story.html
59 Monahan, The Inside Story, supra note 8, chapter 8, at 198-237 (“This Dinner Has Seven Days”).
60 Quebec announced that with or without a constitutional overture from the rest of Canada there would be a
referendum on separation no later than October 26, 1992.
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dynamics of constitutional politics that were put in motion by patriation. An unstable amendment
culture was pivotal in sealing the fate of each. Then Premier Bourassa may have captured the mood
well when he stated – when pressured to re-open the MLA to a wider reform agenda – “I can’t
accept a compromise on a compromise on a compromise”. 61 That sentiment was shared widely, at
the level of executive federalism and by Canadian voters who considered the Charlottetown
Accord a massive exercise in crass, unacceptable compromise. 62
Looking past the prevailing political environment, the central point in this discussion is
Part V, and what went wrong with the textual rules. Rather than facilitate reform, embedding a
series of amending formulas failed to lead the Constitution through the high-stakes processes that
followed patriation. In bypassing Part V and its requirements, the two Accords deflected attention
from patriation’s singular achievement, which was the entrenchment of textual amendment rules. 63
Rather than facilitate reform, embedding a series of amending formulas failed to lead the
Constitution through the high-stakes processes that followed patriation. Instead, both Accords
raised or changed the threshold of agreement required by Part V. While only some of its provisions
were subject to that threshold, the MLA set unanimity as the holistic standard of ratification. 64
Likewise, the Charlottetown Accord’s wide-ranging mixture of reforms was subject to different
Part V rules, which do not include a process or requirement of popular confirmation. Though Part
V does not mention or even contemplate a referendum as part of the process, a nationwide
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referendum asked voters to take or leave the Charlottetown Accord’s disparate reforms on an all
or nothing basis.
An onlooker, such as the notional reader of Constitutional Amendments, could readily
wonder why Canada did not apply the 1982 rules to the Accords. Generally, reform processes do
not proactively seek riskier and more onerous approaches to change than what is prescribed by the
constitution. For Canada, the difficulty was that patriation, including Part V, achieved the longawaited goal of constitutional legality, but lacked legitimacy. Rules that were elusive for most of
Canada’s history, and which in 1982 were intended to anchor the Constitution, lacked authority
because they were not legitimate in Quebec. This was the most immediate deficit, but not the only
one. More profoundly, the prevailing politics of amendment reflected a chronic but shifting
condition of Canadian constitutionalism – after patriation, the gap branched out from its roots in
amendment federalism to embrace tensions and expectations arising from a perception of reform
as an exercise in popular democracy. Part V’s requirements were supplemented, but cross-cutting
dynamics that would not be – or were not – managed nonetheless felled both Accords.
Rather than resolve issues, patriation served to aggravate pre-existing questions about the
legitimacy of amendment. Emblematic of the vaccum on amendment constitutionality was the
Supreme Court’s curious 1981 ruling that unilateral patriation by the federal government was legal,
but unconstitutional.65 Stepping back, it is difficult to imagine a more stunning admission of the
disconnect between the concepts of legality and legitimacy: formal legality was inadequate to
confer constitutional legitimacy. The gap between concepts revolved around the status of
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provincial consent, and although the Supreme Court found unilateral patriation unconstitutional,
it refused to specify what quantum of provincial consent was required. Against decades of
negotiations that at least gestured toward unanimity, albeit without attaining it, that omission
essentially granted the federal government permission to proceed with the “substantial” consent of
the provinces.66 After the Court’s decision, a final round of negotiations in November 1981
culminated in the betrayal of Quebec and patriation over its objection and perceived exclusion
from the agreement.67
As a matter of legality, Quebec was not entitled to veto the patriation amendments.68 Even
so, the perception and claim that the 1982 Constitution would not be legitimate in Quebec unless
the province became a signatory was compelling. By restoring Quebec’s constitutional status and
standing, the MLA would legitimize patriation, including Part V’s amendment rules, once and for
all.

A ratification standard of unanimity served to boost the legitimacy of the Accord by

demonstrating the ROC’s goodwill toward Quebec. The MLA’s underlying logic was somewhat
unconventional. The 1982 amendments that were both legal and constitutional under the Supreme
Court jurisprudence would be legitimized after the fact by the MLA, which reverted to unanimity
and essentially bypassed Part V. Without expressly granting Quebec a veto, the MLA validated
unanimity as the standard of amendment.
In the hurry to include Quebec in the Constitution, the MLA marginalized the textual
amendment rules, rendering them dispensable and secondary to the goal of celebrating Quebec’s
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re-entry to Confederation. At the same time, unanimity raised the stakes in the ROC, where
asymmetric arrangements for Quebec demanded patience while other promises and expectations
for constitutional reform were placed on hold.69 The legitimacy of the MLA, which was fragile
from the outset, declined in the three-year ratification period from 1987 to 1990. In the end, it was
not only the MLA that failed in this process, but Part V as well.
The next miracle was that much more difficult to achieve. One lesson from the MLA was
that the ROC’s pent-up demands for constitutional reform could not be ignored, and were therefore
added to the urgent task of achieving reconciliation with Quebec. Against insurmountable odds
and while straining against the clock, the Charlottetown Accord set out a bulky proposal for
monumental change across institutions and issues. The “Canada Round” gambled that a package
offering placatory reforms across a spectrum of issues, to a host of constitutional stakeholders,
would be difficult to refuse. The other lesson from the MLA, that the democratic community could
not be excluded from the process, did not save the Canada Round. The Charelottetown Accord
lacked legitimacy in the democratic community and was punctured in a nationwide referendum
rejecting the package. 70 That defeat set Canada and Quebec on the path to the 1995 secession
referendum, which was the starting point of this review. With constitutional heroics falling short
a second time, it was once again not just the Accord that failed, but Part V as well.
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Not long after the patriation negotiations of fall 1981, when asked whether he considered
the agreement a success, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau replied, “No, I consider it an abject
failure”.71 From an amendment perspective, the rules incorporated in Part V achieved
constitutional legality but left in place a legitimacy gap that widened over the course of the two
Accords. Quebec’s exclusion created a dangerous gap in legitimacy that was compounded by the
MLA, which lacked legitimacy in the ROC, both on matters of substance and process. At a time
of profound distrust and pessimism it became impossible for the Charlottetown Accord to mitigate
the damage or generate the confidence and goodwill needed to legitimize a reform package that
asked too much of the democratic community.
After 1982, the dynamics unleashed by patriation made it difficult for the Accords to
ground Part V’s rules in an amendment culture that, essentially, had been re-set. Nor did their
failure, under more onerous requirements for ratification, restore or generate confidence in the
textual rules. Instead, Canada continued its search for proxies of legitimacy. At present,
constitutional amendment is governed by a complex combination of Part V rules, federal and
provincial statutes, constitutional jurisprudence, and conventional requirements.72
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One of the misfortunes of Canada’s amendment history is that the Accords disrupted and
undermined Part V’s functionality as the text’s prescribed mechanism for constitutional change.
As Albert has observed, the statutory conditions “now exercise a constitution-level constraint on
the constitution’s rules for formal amendment”, despite “not earning their special status through
the channels the constitution requires for achieving constitutional status”. 73
Today, Canada’s amendment constitutionalism suffers from a form of hyper rigidity, which
emanates from multiple sources inside and outside the constitutional text. Both because and in
spite of the multiplicity of rules, it remains unclear what amendment legality requires. Textual
change is also in a state of paralysis due to constructive unamendability, because Canada’s
constitutional culture has not articulated and might not know what a legitimate process of
constitutional reform looks like. It is an experience that remains outside its amendment narrative.
On their face, Part V’s amending formulas are strict enough to ensure a rigorous process
of constitutional amendment. In combination, the rules facilitate constitutional change that falls
within the sole jurisdiction of the federal government or provinces, or is bilateral in nature. 74
Otherwise, the threshold rises for amendments that engage the interests of federalism or implicate
national institutions, such as the head of state. Under ss.38 and 41, constitutional amendment
proceeds only when high levels of agreement can be reached. 75 These requirements are difficult to
meet, but are generally consistent with the types of proposals that were widely discussed and
negotiated prior to patriation.

73

Ibid. at 131.
Supra note 10.
75 Ibid.
74

23

Part V’s textual rules should be accepted and engaged as the governing standard for
constitutional amendment. Pausing a moment, the need to make an appeal to the formal rules is in
itself an interesting comment on the state of amendment constitutionalism in Canada. The 1982
solution to a history of amendment incapacity may not be perfect, but balances the competing
interests in regulating the content and pace of change. The framework is sufficiently demanding
to deter amendments that lack sufficient support, as a matter of federalism, because it sets a
workable threshold for agreement. Put another way, Part V’s calibrations are pragmatic and
reflective of the reality of Canadian federalism.
Part V’s rules should govern any reform process in the future, albeit with these comments
and caveats. First, and in large part because of Canada’s failed reform initiatives, Albert expresses
skepticism about the viability of omnibus amendment bills, proposing instead a “single subject”
approach requiring every amendment be addressed and ratified as a discrete constitutional
change.76 At the least, it is clear that the Charlottetown Accord’s omnibus package, which was
attempted under conditions of constitutional duress, was deeply flawed. Without necessarily
endorsing Albert’s single-subject approach, constitutional change going forward should at least
match proposed amendments up with the requirements of Part V. Packaging a mix of reforms
together that are subject to differing and upgraded ratification requirements is unnecessary and
decreases the chances of success in constitutional amendment.
Second, the status of popular confirmation or ratification as a functional requirement of
reform is an open question. To the extent it is a de facto requirement, a referendum process would
be more effective if implemented through co-operative arrangements between the federal
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government and provinces. Complex and overlapping statutory requirements clutter and confuse
the process, once again limiting the hope of successful reform. At minimum, there should be a coordinated and transparent referendum and single vote across the nation.
Meanwhile, it is unlikely in the extreme that the current impasse on amendment will be
broken or resolved by superimposing overarching forms of extra-textual legality onto Part V. Such
gestures deepen the rigidity and unamendability of the Constitution without shoring up its
legitimacy. To that point, such means are counterproductive, because they diffuse and confuse the
core question of what makes constitutional change legitimate. Requirements that supplement Part
V are the product of constitutional politics and an amendment culture rendered dysfunctional by
the lack – over most of Canada’s history – of any concrete sense of amendment legality, or
constitutional sovereignty. Filling the vacuum by proliferating and escalating the threshold for
amendment cannot circumvent or resolve the core issue: that the legitimacy of constitutional
amendment remains unsettled. A surfeit of overlapping and onerous requirements serve more to
impossibilize the amendment process than to find and voice the missing legitimacy.
Rules: a constitution’s deepest vulnerabilities and greatest strengths
My own experience of both Accords has affected my response to Albert’s intense focus on
the formalities of textual amendment rules. While I have much admired him for undertaking a
project of such great intellectual challenge, my lingering question was whether an exclusive focus
on text could offer sufficient or penetrating insight on the challenges surrounding constitutional
change. In candid terms, my bias was that static rules did not seem like the most interesting or
critical element in any process of amendment and reform. That view was informed by my own
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moment in time, when I was placed in the midst of highly charged and unpredictable events that
disregarded and marginalized Part V’s rules.77
Much later, I have learned from Albert’s cumulative scholarship, including Constitutional
Amendments, that Canada’s amendment constitutionalism has much to learn from his work on the
formal legalities of constitutional change. It is clearer to me now that the noise, the crises of
patriation and the Accords, the Constitution’s chronic unamendability, and the intense dynamics
of amendment culture are, at their heart, a function of longstanding and unresolved issues with
amendment rules. The lack of textual rules, Part V’s defeasible authority after patriation, and the
superimposition of more and more rules after the Accords validate Albert’s central claim that “no
part of the Constitution is more important than its rules of change”. 78 As argued above, with the
events of patriation and the Accords in the distance, it is time to revisit the question of amendment
rules and do so from the perspective that Part V’s framework for change is both legal and
legitimate.
Writing on the 30th anniversary of the MLA’s failure, it is tempting to imagine what might
have happened had the Accord been ratified. Constitutional reform would not have been over but,
in light of the promises and expectations on hold, would only just have begun. The regional
divisions and lack of generosity in the pervasive amendment culture suggest that achieving further
reforms would present a mighty challenge. It is difficult to know whether Part V’s rules would
have been followed in any subsequent round of reform, or whether a referendum might have been
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added. In other words, it is unclear what the legitimacy of constitutional amendment might have
looked like had the MLA been ratified. Still, it is unlikely that the overlapping and sequential
requirements now in place would have become necessary. Contentious as it was, the MLA offered
an opportunity to correct the patriation process with constitutional grace and at relatively low
constitutional cost, given what followed. Its failure catalyzed a further trajectory that complicated,
defeated, and demoralized the prospects for change. That demoralization includes Part V’s rules
for change.
Albert cites Edmund Burke’s observation that a state without the means of change is a state
without the means of its own conservation. 79 Canada has mishandled the amendment file
throughout its constitutional history. Dramatically, and despite the self-inflicted wounds of the
Accords, the Constitution and nation survived the turmoil surrounding the incorporation of textual
rules. Ironically and paradoxically, this history shows strength as well as vulnerability. The
protracted unamendability of the Constitution is a clear source of vulnerability that moved
decisively in the wrong direction after patriation. As suggested, Canada’s ongoing amendment
vulnerability can be ameliorated, at least in part, by accepting that Part V’s rules govern the process
of constitutional reform. Whether that is realistic in the foreseeable future remains to be seen.
There is strength, too, in Canada’s untidy history of amendment, including the colossal
failure of two Accords. Contrary to what Albert might hope, its constitutional resilience does not
rest, principally, in a commitment to textualism and the formality of rules. It is found, instead, in
an uncanny capacity, over time and through difficult challenges in effecting change, for pragmatic
adaptability. This adaptability does not conform to principle and is quite unpredictable but does,
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in a way, define Canada’s as yet unformed and still emerging relationship with amendment rules
and that part of its constitutional soul.

